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Abstract
We search for strategy-proof solutions in the context of (many-to-one)
matching problems (Gale and Shapley 1962). In this model, whenever the
firms can hire as many workers as they want (the capacities are unlimited)
the stable set is a singleton. There exists a Pareto efficient, individually
rational, and strategy-proof matching rule if and only if the capacities are un-
limited. Furthermore, whenever the capacities unlimited, the matching rule
which selects the unique stable matching is the only matching rule that is
Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78
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'This paper is based on the fourth chapter of my dissertation submitted to the Department of
Economics, University of Rochester. I wish to thank William Thomson for his efforts in supervision
as well as his useful suggestions. I am grateful to Jose Alcalde, Salvador Barberk, Alvin Roth,
James Schuminmer, Marilda Sotomayor, an associate editor and particularly to Stephen Ching,
Tank Kara and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Tank Kara also significantly
simplified the proof of Proposition 4. All errors are my own responsibility.
A class of public decision problems that has been extensively analyzed is the class
of two-sided matching problems. (For an exposition of game theoretic modelling and
analysis of such problems, see Roth and Sotomayor 1990). In real life applications of
these models, many-to-one matching is the most typical case, where one side (of the
market) consists of institutions and the other side consists of individuals: colleges
admit many students, firms hire many workers, and hospitals employ many interns.
On the other hand, students attend one college, workers work for one firm, and
interns work for one hospital.
In this paper we deal with many-to-one matching problems
1. The class of one-to-
one matching problems is a subclass of the class of many-to-one matching problems.
For simplicity we refer to the institutions side of the market as "firms" and to
the individuals side as "workers". Each firm has a preference relation over groups
of workers of size at most its capacity, and each worker has a preference relation
over firms and being unemployed. The preferences of the workers and the firms
are strict. We furthermore assume that the preferences of the firms over groups of
workers are separable (Barberi, Sonnenschein and Zhou 1991): consider two groups
of workers such that one of the groups contains the other one and it is larger by one
worker. Then the firm prefers the larger group if and only if the additional worker
is acceptable by himself. An allocation in this context is a matching of firms and
workers.
A matching is individually rational if no worker prefers being unemployed to
his assignment and no firm prefers a subset of its assignment to its assignment. A
matching is stable if it is individually rational, and there does not exist a firm-worker
pair such that the worker prefers the firm to his assignment and the firm prefers a
subset of its assignment joined with the worker to its assignment.
A solution is a systematic procedure to select a set of matchings for each matching
problem. We refer to solutions as matching rules. Some examples of matching rules
'Also known as college admissions problems. Gale and Shapley (1962) introduces the college
admissions problems. Gale and Sotomayor (1985), Roth (1984,85a,b,86), Roth and Sotomayor
(1989) study various aspects of the college admissions problems.
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are the stable rule, which selects the set of stable matchings, the Pareto rule, which
selects the set of Pareto efficient matchings, and the individually rational rule, which
selects the set of individually rational matchings.
In a public decision problem, agents usually have private information about their
own preferences. In most cases it may be unreasonable to expect them to reveal
them truthfully. However there may be solutions which give agents the incentive
to be truthful independently of the other agents' behavior; this property is known
as strategy-proofness
2
. Roth (1982a) shows that there is no strategy-proof selection
from the stable rule in the context of one-to-one matching. Alcalde and Barbera
(1994) improve on this result and show that there is no strategy-proof matching
rule that is Pareto efficient and individually rational in this context. The class of
one-to-one matching problems is a subclass of the class of many-to-one matching
problems (where the capacity of each firm is one). Therefore the negative results of
Roth (1982a) and Alcalde and Barbera (1994) carry over to many-to-one matching
problems.3
In this paper we show that there are significant changes in these results if the
capacities of the firms are not binding. We consider matching problems with unlim-
ited capacities. That is, each firm can hire as many workers as it wants and thus its
capacity is (greater than or) equal to the number of workers. For matching problems
.with unlimited capacities, there exists a unique stable matching for each matching
problem. The stable rule is a strategy-proof matching rule and furthermore it is the
2
Strategy-proofness was first analyzed in abstract social choice models where there are few
or no restrictions on preferences. Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) show that, under
minor conditions strategy-proofness i  equivalent to dictatorship. In models with more structure
(such as economic models) some positive results are available. See for example Barbera, Gal
and Stachetti (1993), Barbera and Jackson (1994) Ching (1993,94), Moulin (1980), and Sprumont
(1991) for some positive results, Sprumont (1994), Thomson (1994) for surveys on recent results
of strategy-proofness, and Barbera and Jackson (1995), Barbera and Peleg (1990), Hurwicz (1972),
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), Tadenuma and Thomson (1991), Zhou (1991) for further
negative results.'Kara and Sonmez (1993,94) weakens the incentive requirement and search for Nash imple-
mentable matching rules. They show that the stable rule is the minimal Nash implementable
solution that is Pareto efficient and individually rational.
only matching rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof
Unfortunately it is not coalitionally strategy-proof4 and hence there is no matching
rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and coalitionally strategy-proof. It
is important to note that the core correspondence coincides with the stable rule for
this model. We also show the independence of the axioms in the characterization
result by means of simple examples.
In Section 4 we relax the unlimited capacities assumption. We show that the
unlimited capacity condition is "tight" for the existence of a matching rule that is
Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. That is, whenever there is
a firm with a smaller capacity than the number of the workers, there is no matching
rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof. Therefore,
there exists a matching rule with these properties if and only if the capacities are
unlimited. Another corollary is that whenever there is a matching rule satisfying
Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness, it is unique.
2 The Model
A (many-to-one) matching problem is a four-tuple (F, W, q, R). The first
two components are non-empty, finite, and disjoint sets of firms and workers
F = {f1,..., f,} and W = {w1,..., wm}. We assume that there are at least two
firms and two workers. The third component is a vector of positive natural numbers
q = (qy,,.... , qg.), where qf, is the capacity of firm fi E F. The last component
R = (Ri)iEFUW is a list of preference relations of firms and workers. Let Pi denote
the strict relation associated with the preference relation Ri for all i E F U W.
We consider the case where F, W and q are fixed and hence each preference profile
defines a matching problem.
The preference relation R. of worker w E W is a linear order on E. =
{fil}, . ., {fn}, 0). Let R,,, be the class of all such preference relations for worker
w E W. The preference relation R1 of firm f E F is a linear order on E! = {G} w
"A matching rule is coalitionally strategy-proof if no group of agents can benefit by jointly
misrepresenting their preferences.
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and it is separable (Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou 1991). That is, for all G C W
such that |GI <q , for all w E W\G
(GU {w})PG = {w}P 10.
Let Ry be the class of all such preferences for firm f E F. Let 1Z = IfEF R7f x
[ lwEw Z,.. For all R E R, G C F U W, we denote the restriction of R to G by Ro,
and the set (F U W)\G by -G. For all i E F U W, we denote the set (F U W)\{i}
by -i.
The choice of a firm f from a group of workers G C W under the preference RI
is defined as
Ch1(R1,G) = {G'C GI G'E EE, G'RIG" for all G"CGsuch that G"E E}.
A matching p is a mapping from the set F U W into 2FuW such that:
1. For all w E W, Ip(w)| 1 and p(w) =0 ifp(w) F;
2. For all f E F, I(f)| qg and p(f)= 0 if p(f) W;
matching p is blocked by a firm f E F under R if there is a worker w E p(f) which
is not acceptable to f under R. A matching p is individually rational under R if
it is not blocked by a worker or a firm under R. We denote the set of all individually
rational matchings under R by 1(R).
A matching p is blocked by a firm-worker pair (f, w) E F x W under R if
{f}Pwp(w) and p(f) 0 Ch1(R1 , p(f) U {w}). A matching p is stable under R if it
is not blocked by a worker, a firm, or a firm-worker pair. We denote the set of all
stable matchings under R by S(R).
Let Ay(Ry) denote the set of acceptable workers for firm f E F under Rf E Rf.
Formally
A f(R1 ) = {w E W | {w}P10} for all f E F, for all Rf E R1 .
Let Byf(Rw) denote the set of workers for whom firm f E F is acceptable.
Similarly, Bw(RF) denotes the set of firms for whom worker w E W is acceptable.
Formally
By(Rw) = {w E W I|{f}Pw0}
Bw(RF) = {f E F I {w}Py0}
for all f E F, for all Rw E Rw,
for all w E W, for all RF E RF.3. For all (f, w) E F x W, p(w) = {f} if and only if w E p(f).
For any i E F U W, we refer to p(i) as the assignment of i at p. We denote the
set of all matchings for the triple (F, W, q) by M(F, W, q).
Given a preference relation Rf of a firm f E F, initially defined over E), we
extend it to the set of matchings M(F, W, q), in the following natural way: f prefers
the matching p to the matching p' if and only if it prefers its assignment under y to
its assignment under p'. We slightly abuse the notation and also use Rf to denote
this extension. The same can be done for each worker w E W.
A firm f E F is acceptable to a worker w E W under R if {f}P.0. A worker
w E W is acceptable to a firm f E F under R if {w}P 1 0. A matching p is
blocked by a worker w E W under R if p(w) is not acceptable to w under R.
A matching p is blocked by a firm f under R if p(f) Chf(Rj, p(f)). Note
that this statement is equivalent to the following under separable preferences: A
Note that w E A1(R1) if and only if f E B,(RF) for all f E F, for all w E W, and
for all RF E lZF-
A matching p is blocked by a coalition G C F U W via a matching p' under
R if
1. p'(i)Rc G for all i E G,
2. p'(i)Rjp(i) for all i E G,
3. p'(j)Pp(j) for some j E G.
A matching p is in the core of the matching problem R E ? if it is not blocked by
any coalition via any matching.
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A matching p is Pareto efficient under R if there is no other matching p' such
that p'(i)Rip(i) for all i E F U W and p'(j)Pjp(j) for some j E F U W. We denote
the set of all Pareto efficient matchings under R by P(R).
A matching rule is a correspondence : R -' M(F, W, q). A matching rule e is
Pareto efficient if p(R) C P(R) for all R E 7Z. A matching rule p is individually
rational if p(R) C 1(R) for all R E 7?. The next property concerns single-valued
solutions. A matching rule e is strategy-proof if
5P(R)(i)Rip(R R')(i) for all R E R, for all i E F U W, for all R E R;.
3 Results under Unlimited Capacities
In this section, we consider the model when q |WI for all f E F. That is, each
firm can employ as many workers as it wants. We refer to this case as matching
problems with unlimited capacities. One application for this case is the model
where each firm produces one good (not necessarily the same), it is price taker, labor
is the only variable factor of production, and the marginal contribution of a worker
to a firm is independent of the other workers employed by that firm. Another
application is the membership recruitment of American sororities. Here, in most
situations the number of available slots at any sorority is more than the number of
the applicants. (See Mongell and Roth 1991.) In the next section, we will drop the
unlimited capacities assumption.
For this model, the separability of the preferences of the firms implies that the
matching p is blocked by a pair (f, w) E F x W under R if and only if
{f}Pwp(w) and {w}Pj0.
3.1 The Stable Rule
In general many-to-one matching problems, in which there is no restriction on the
preferences of the agents, the set of stable matchings may be empty. Gale and
Shapley (1962), Roth (1984), Roth and Sotomayor (1990) [Chapter 6, Section 1]
identify natural restrictions on preferences for which the set of stable matchings is
non-empty. Proposition 1 concerns the set of stable matchings in matching problems
with unlimited capacities. It says that with separable preferences not only the stable
set is non-empty, but it is a singleton.
Proposition 1: The stable set S(R) is a singleton for each preference profile R E R
on the class of matching problems with separable preferences and unlimited capac-
ities.
Proof: Let (F, W, q) be such that q, |WI for all f; E F. Let R E R. Let
p E M(F, W, q) be such that, for all w E W,
p(w) = {f E Bw(RF) I {f)}Pw0 and {f}Rw{f'} for all f' E Bw(RF)).
As preferences are strict, there exists a unique such matching.
We claim that p is the unique stable matching under R. First we show that p
is stable under R. We have p(w)R0 for all w E W. Furthermore w E p(f) only if
w E A1(R1) for all f E F. This, with preferences being separable, implies that p is
individually rational under R. Next consider any firm-worker pair (f, w) E F x W
such that w V p(f). Then, either w g A1(R1) and therefore 0P1{w}, or p(w)P.{f}.
Hence no worker-firm pair blocks p under R. Therefore p is stable under R.
Finally we show that p is the only stable matching under R. Let p' E M(F, W, q)
and p' 0 p. If p' is not individually rational, then p' is not stable and we are done.
Otherwise, there is a firm-worker pair (f, w) E F x W such that w E A1(R1), w V
p'(f) and {f}P p'(w). Thus, (p'(f) U {w})Pyp'(f) and {f}P p'(w), and therefore
the firm-worker pair (f, w) blocks p' under R. Hence p' is not stable under R.
Q.E.D.
Let S : R -+ M(F, W, q) be the matching rule which selects the set of stable
matchings for each preference profile R E R. Due to Proposition 1, S is a single-
valued matching rule on the class of matching problems with unlimited capacities.
We call S the stable rule.
Remark 1: Proposition 1 still holds if the capacities of all firms are greater than or
equal to the number of workers minus one. However as long as there is a firm, say
firm f, which has a capacity less than the number of workers minus one, this is no
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longer true. In this case we can construct an example in which the top two choices
of the firm f differ by (at least) two workers and the firm f is the only acceptable
firm to any worker. In this example the matching which assigns the firm f its top
choice and the emptyset to all other firms, and the matching which assigns the firm
f its second choice and the emptyset to all other firms are both stable. Therefore
on the class of matching problems with separable preferences the capacities of all
firms being greater than or equal to the number of workers minus one is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the stable rule to be single-valued.
Remark 2: Roth and Sotomayor (1990) [Theorem 6.7] shows that on the class
of matching problems with substitutable preferences5 (which is a larger class than
matching problems with separable preferences) there is a stable matching which is
preferred to any other stable matching by all firms. They refer to this matching
as the firm-optimal stable matching and construct an algoritm (which is a variant
of the deferred acceptance algoritm of Gale and Shapley) to obtain it. They also
construct an algoritm to obtain an analagous stable matching, the worker-optimal
stable matching, which is preferred to any other stable matching by all workers.
One can obtain an alternative proof of Proposition 1 by observing that these two
algoritms lead to the same matching when the preferences are separable and the
capacities are unlimited.
3.2 Existence and Characterization
Roth (1982a) shows that in the context of one-to-one matching problems (also known
as marriage problems) there is no matching rule which always selects a stable match-
ing and is strategy-proof. Alcalde and Barberk (1994), improve on this result and
show that there is no matching rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational
5
A firm f has substitutable preferences if whenever its preferred set of employees from a group
G includes the workers w and w', its preferred set of employees from the group G\{w'} also includes
w. Formally the preference relation Rj is substitutable if
For all GC W with w,w' E Ch1(Rj,G), w E Chj(Rj,G\w').
and strategy-proof. These impossibilities extend to many-to-one matching problems.
However there are significant changes in these results when firms can hire as many
workers as they want and their preferences are separable.
Proposition 2: The stable rule is strategy-proof on the class of matching problems
with separable preferences and unlimited capacities.
Proof: Let (F, W, q) be such that q, > |WI for all f; E F. Let R E 1?, p= S(R),6
and w E W. We have p(w)R.0 and p(w)R.{f} for all f E B.(RF). Furthermore
S(Rw, R')(w) ; B.(RF) for all R' E R.. Therefore
S(R)(w) = p(w)R.S(R-w, R'.)(w) for all R' E R,
and hence no worker can benefit by unilateral deviation.
Let f E F. Let w E W\p(f) be such that {w}P1 0. Then we have p(w)P.{f}.
We have two cases to consider.
Case 1: p(w) = 0 Let R' E Rf and p' E M(F, W, q) be such that w E p'(f). Then
w blocks p' under (Rg, R') and therefore p' V S(R-g, R').
Case 2: p(w) E F
Let R' E Rf and p' E M(F, W,q) be such that w E p'(f). We have
p(w)Pw{f}, w E A,(W)(Rp(w)), and therefore (f, w) blocks p' under (R-.f, R').
Thus p' V S(R.1f, R'1).
This, together with the individual rationality of the stable rule, implies that
S(R)(f) =p(f )RSS(R..5, R'S)(f) for all R'S E R$
and hence no firm can benefit by unilateral deviation either. Q.E.D.
Next we show that the stable rule is the only matching rule that is Pareto
efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof on this domain.
Theorem 1: The stable rule is the only matching rule that is Pareto efficient,
individually rational, and strategy-proof on the class of matching problems with
separable preferences and unlimited capacities.
6We write p = S(R) instead of {p} = S(R).
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Proof' Let (F, W, q) be such that qj, ;> |WI for all f, E F. Strategy-proofness of
the stable rule follows from Proposition 2, and its individual rationality follows from
the definition of stability. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) [Chapter 6] show Pareto
efficiency for a wider class, the matching problems with substitutable preferences
and unlimited capacities. Nevertheless we prove Pareto efficiency for the sake of
completeness.
Let R E 1Z and y = S(R). Let p' E M(F, W, q) be such that p'(i)Pip(i) for
some i E F U W. To prove Pareto efficiency we need to show that p(j)P;jp'(j) for
some j E F U W. We have two cases to consider:
Case 1: i E F We have p = S(R) and p'(i)Pp(i), therefore there exists a worker
w E W such that {w}P;O, w V p(i), and {w} E p'(i). This implies w E A,(Ri)
and thus p(w)R,{i} = p'(w). But w V p(i) and preferences are strict, therefore
p(w)Pwp'(w).
Case 2: i E 14'
We have p = S(R), and p'(i)Pip(i), therefore p'(i) C F and i g A '(i)(R'(i))
Let p'(i) = {f}. If p(f)Py p'(f), then we are done. If p'(f)Rjp(f), then there exists
a worker w E W such that wPy0, w ¢ p(f) and w E p'(f). This implies w E A,(R 1 )
and thus p(w)R.{f} = p'(w). But w V p(f) and preferences are strict, therefore
Conversely let y : R -+ M(F, W, q) be Pareto efficient, individually rational,
and strategy-proof. Suppose p L S. Then there exists a preference profile R E R
such that p(R) # p where p = S(R). This, together with p(R) C 1(R), implies
that there is a worker w E W such that
p(w)Pp(R)(w) and w E AP(w)(Rg(w)).
Let R' E R, be as follows:
1. p(w)P'0,
2. OP'{f } for all f E F\{p(w)}.
Since p is individually rational, we either have p(R_., R',)(w) = 0 or p(R_., R'.) =
p(w). But 1 (w)P'0, w E A,(w)(R,(w)), and V is Pareto efficient, therefore
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p(R-.., R',)(w) = p(w). That is, worker w benefits from announcing the false
preference R,, contradicting strategy-proofness. Q.E.D.
3.3 Independence of the Axioms
The following examples establishes the independence of the axioms in Theorem 1.
Consider the matching problems with unlimited capacities.
Example 1: Let y : R - M(F, W, q) be such that, for all R E R, for all i E
F U W, cp(R)(i) = 0.
It is easy to see that the matching rule co is individually rational, and strategy-
proof, yet it is not Pareto efficient.
Example 2: Let p :1Z -+ M(F, W,q) be such that, for all R E7, for all w E W,
p(R)(w) = {f E F | {f}R,{f'} for all f' E F and {f}R,0}
It is easy to see that the matching rule co is Pareto efficient, and strategy-proof,
yet it is not individually rational.
Example 3: Let p : 7? - M(F, W, q) be such that, for all R E R
p(R)(f1) = Ch1, (R1,, B1, (Rw))
p(R)(f2) = Ch12(R12, B/2 (Rw)\p(R)(fi))
So(R)(f,) = Ch1y(R,, By,(Rw)\ Uij o(R)(fk))
p(R)(fn) = Ch1 .(R$., B1 .(Rw)\ Uk o(R)(fk))
It is easy to see that the matching rule So is individually rational and yet it is
not strategy-proof. The following sketch shows that it is also Pareto efficient: As
the matching p(R) is individually rational any matching that Pareto dominates it
should also be individually rational. Suppose there is such a matching p. Under the
matching p(R) firm 1 gets its top choice among those it can get at any individu-
ally rational matching and therefore p(f1) = p(R)(f,). Given this, with a similar
12
argument we can show that p(f2) = p(R)(f2 ) and so on. This eventually leads to
p = W(R) contradicting that p Pareto dominates p(R).
3.4 An Impossibility Result
A matching rule is strategy-proof i no agent can benefit by unilaterally misrepre-
senting his preferences. However, even if a matching rule is strategy-proof, a group
of agents can benefit by jointly misrepresenting their preferences.
A matching rule y : ?--> M(F, W, q) is coalitionally strategy-proof if for all
G C F U W and for all R'Q E HfEFnG Rf X HwEWnG X,, there is an agent i E G
such that
,p(R)(i)Rip(R-G, R'G)(i).
Proposition 3: The stable rule is not coalitionally strategy-proof on the class of
matching problems with separable preferences and unlimited capacities.
Proof: Let F = {fl, f2}, W = {w1,w2}, and R E 1Z be such that
Roth (1985a) introduces the class of responsive preferences, a subclass of the class
of separable preferences: A firm's preferences over groups of workers are responsive
if it is separable, and for any two assignments that differ in only one worker, the firm
prefers the assignment containing the more preferred worker as a group by himself.
Formally, the preference relation Rf is responsive if
1. For all G C W with |G|< qf, for all w E W\G, (G U {w})PfG if and only
if {w}PfO,
2. For all G G W, with IGI <qf, for all w,w' E W\G, (GU {w})Pj(GU {w'})
if and only if {w}Pf{w'}.
Note that the preferences of the firms in the proof of Proposition 3 satisfy this
stronger requirement.
Remark 3: Roth (1985a) constructs a matching problem in which there exists an
individually rational matching which is strictly preferred to any stable matching by
all firms. The proof of Proposition 3 makes use of a similar construction: Consider
the preference profile R. The matching S(R{wix2), R'n,.2 ) is individually rational
and it is strictly preferred to the unique stable matching S(R) by both firms.
Remark 4: Note that each worker's assignment is independent of the other workers'
preferences under the stable rule. Therefore no group of workers can benefit by
jointly manipulating their preferences under the stable rule. Furthermore, if a group
of agents G C F U W can gain by jointly manipulating, then the group of firms G\W
can also gain by jointly manipulating.
3.5 Relations with the Core
The core correspondence is one of the most important solutions of cooperative game
theory. Roth (1985b) shows that when the preferences of the firms are responsive, the
stable set coincides with the core for each matching problert. Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) [Proposition 6.4] extend this result to the case of substitutable preferences and
unlimited capacities. (Recall that separability implies substitutability.) Therefore
all our results concerning the stable rule applies to the core correspondence.
{f1}P.,{f 2 )P w0
{f 2)PW2(Ifl }PU20
{wi, w3}Pji {w2}Pf, {w}Pf,0
{w1, w2}P 2 {wi}P 2 {w 2 }P120
We have S(R)(fi) = {wI}, S(R)(f2) = {w2 }. Let R'1, E Rf, R'f2 E R 2 be such
that
{w 2 }P,OP,{w1, 2}P, {wi}
{wi }Pj20Pf2 {wi, w2}P;2 {w2}
Then S(R{,.w2), R{f, 12})(fi) = {W2}, S(R{w,,,,}, R'f,,2 )(f 2) = {wi}. There-
fore, firms f, and f2 gain by jointly manipulating their preferences. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1: There is no matching rule that is Pareto efficient, individually ra-
tional, and coalitionally strategy-proof on the class of matching problems with sep-
arable preferences and unlimited capacities. Proof: Follows from Theorem 1 and
Proposition 3.
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All these results focus our attention to a related model, the "housing market"
(Shapley and Scarf 1974). In that model, each individual owns one indivisible good,
and has preferences over the goods held by all the agents in the economy. An
allocation is a matching of agents with goods. Roth and Postlewaite (1977) show
that when preferences are strict, there is a unique core allocation for each problem.
Roth (1982b) shows that the core correspondence is strategy-proof and Ma (1994)
shows that it is the only rule that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and
strategy-proof. Both in housing markets and matching problems with unlimited
capacities, the core correspondence is single-valued, it is strategy-proof; and it is the
only solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof.
4 Impossibility with Limited Capacities
Alcalde and Barbera (1994) show that there is no matching rule that is Pareto ef-
cient, individually rational, and strategy-proof in the context of one-to-one matching
problems. In the next proposition we show that this result extends to the model in
which firms cannot hire as many workers as they want.
Proposition 4: Consider the matching problems with separable preferences. Let
(F, W, q) be such that qj, < |WI for some f; E F. Then, there is no matching rule
that is Pareto efficient, individually rational and strategy-proof
Proof: Assume that there exists a firm f; E F with qj; < |WI. Let i = 1 without
loss of generality. Let W1 C W\{wi,w2} be such that IWi = gl - 1. Let R E 1Z
be such that
and R11 , R2 are responsive.




{f}' PW2 P {f}
R' =A;
for all GE E \{W 1 U {w,}, {w2),O1,
for all w E W\{w2},
for all f E F\{f2},
for all f E F\{f},
for all i E (FU W)\{fj,f 2 ,ww 2 },
and R'f,, R', are responsive.
Let < be Pareto efficient, individually rational and strategy-proof.
We have
RI(R_ w, L) = p ( f= f)
(W U {w2) (w1l
and therefore cv(R..{w,, 2 ), R'i ,, ) = p. Moreover
p(f-- , ')(w) RI,5  --(R {,,u1, R )w = {f2}
by strategy-proofness and therefore 9(R-,, R',)(w1) = {f2}. This together with
Pareto efficiency and individual rationality of W implies that
Similarly
W(R)(w2)RwW(R-.., R',)(w2) i= (f}
by strategy-proofness and therefore ,(R)(w2) = {f, }. This together with Pareto
efficiency and individual rationality of o implies that
f(R) =p
We also have
I(- (2,R',,) v= 2
{f,, ,}) W U {w1} {w2}
W, U {w1}Pf,Wi U {w 2 }Pf,GPf,0
{w2 } P 12 P(w,}P/2 /2{w
OP1G
{f 2 }Pw, (f}Pw,OPw,I{f}
{f 1}P {f 2)Pe0Pe{f}
{f,}P.0P,{f}
0P {f}
for all GE Eg,\{W U {wi},Wi U {W2},0}.
for all wE W\{wi,w2),
for all f E F\{fl, f 2}, for all G G W,
for all f E F\{f i , f 2},
for all f E F\{f i , f 2},
for all w E W1, for all f E P\{fi},
for all w E W\(W1 U {wi,w 2}), for all f E F,
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and therefore (R-{ f,,h), '{f1,2}) = v. Moreover
p(R--2 , R' 2)(f)Rf,p(R.{f, 2 ), !R'{f ,,2})(fi) = W1 U {wi}
by strategy-proofness and therefore (R-- 2 , R'h)(fi) = W1 U {w 1 }. This together
with Pareto efficiency and individual rationality of p implies that
p(R--2,R',) = v
Similarly
o(R)(f2)R 2 po(R-I 2 , R'/2)(f 2) = {W2}
by strategy-proofness and therefore w2 E c (R)(f 2) contradicting co(R) = P. Q.E.D.
Now we are ready to characterize the class of matching problems that admit
Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof matching rules whenever
the firms' preferences are separable.
Theorem 2: Consider the matching problems with separable preferences. There
exists a Pareto efficient, individually rational, and strategy-proof matching rule if
and only if the capacities are unlimited.
Proof: Follows from Proposition 2 and Proposition 4.
Remark 5: When the preferences are responsive they are also separable. Therefore
all our positive results extend to the matching problems with responsive preferences.
Furthermore, in the proofs of the negative results (Propositions 3 and 4) firms' pref-
erences are responsive. Finally in the uniqueness part of Theorem 1, we constructed
the preferences such that all preferences are responsive as long as the initial pref-
erences has that property. Hence all our results extend to matching problems with
responsive preferences.
and studies strategy-proofness in this context. Generalized matching problems in-
clude both the housing market and one-to-one matching problems, as well as the
roommate problems (Gale and Shapley 1962). He shows that on the subclasses
with a well-defined core correspondence, there exists a rule that is Pareto efficient,
individually rational, and strategy-proof only if the core correspondence is single-
valued. Moreover if there is such a rule, it is the core correspondence. Note that
these results are also valid in the context of (many-to-one) matching problems as
the core correspondence is single-valued whenever the capacities are unlimited (and
the preferences of the firms are separable).
5 Concluding Remarks
As we need the unlimited capacities assumption to obtain a positive result, the
practical relevance of our results are likely to be rather thin. On the other hand, our
results suggest that in the context of many-to-one matching problems it is possible to
achieve strategy-proofness together with Pareto efficiency and individual rationality
only by the means of the core correspondence.7 We believe this result provides
a link between cooperative game theory and non-cooperative game theory, giving
important non-cooperative support to the core correspondence.
4.1 More on the Core
The impossibility theorem we obtain in this section focus our attention to a related
work, Sonmez (1995). Motivated by the major differences in the results concerning
strategy-proofness in two closely related models, the housing market and one-to-one
matching problems, Sonmez (1995) introduces the generalized matching problems
7Note that there are subclasses of matching problems where the core correspondence is single-
valued, yet it is not strategy-proof. For example this is the case on the subclasses where each firm
has a capacity equal to the number of the workers minus one.
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